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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arnves on appeal from the jury verdict entered In favor of 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Respondents Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC ("PPCM" or 
"Profits Plus"), and Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP ("Dollars and Sense" or the "Limited 
Partnership"). Profits Plus, Dollars and Sense, and Robert Coleman commenced this action with 
the filing of a Complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a decree that Jeffrey Podesta and 
Street Search, LLC, had no ownership interest in Profits Plus or Dollars and Sense. Jeffrey 
Podesta and Street Search, LLC, responded with an answer and multiple counterclaims against 
all Respondents. 
The case was tried to a jury upon Appellants Street Search LLC's claim that Street 
Search, LLC entered into a contract with Profits Plus for the transfer of a 50% co-general partner 
interest in Dollars and Sense. By its unanimous verdict rendered on February 17, 2012, the jury 
found that the Appellants failed to prove their Counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty. 1 The trial court subsequently entered Judgment in favor of Respondents on all 
claims and defenses asserted by Appellants and upon Respondents' claims for declaratory 
judgment. In addition, the trial court denied Appellants' motions for new trial and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and granted Respondents their attorney fees and costs in the sum of 
$193,526.77. 
I Prior to the trial, Respondents filed three motions for summary judgment and successfully eliminated all 
of the Counterclaims asserted by Jeffrey Podesta, an individual; all contract and fraud claims against 
Dollars and Sense, and all contract claims against Robert Coleman. Appellants' claims for an Accounting 
and Request for Apportionment of a Receiver (Counts V and VI), were never dismissed and remained 
active as of the trial. Based upon the verdict of the jury, further consideration of Apellants'remaining 
claims was rendered moot. 
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On February 17, 2012, after an eight-day jury trial, conducted over the course of two 
weeks, the jury returned its unanimous Special Verdict, finding that Appellants failed to prove 
the existence of a contract between Street Search and Profits Plus. R., p. 000697-700. Appellants 
do not appeal from the jury verdict. Similarly, the list of issues that Appellants do not appeal, or 
if appealed, do not support, is compelling: Appellants do not appeal from the vast majority of the 
trial court's interlocutory rulings or orders, including, but not limited to, the trial court's rulings 
upon (i) Respondents' motions for summary judgment; (ii) the trial court's order denying 
Appellants' motion to add a claim for punitive damages; (iii) orders denying and granting 
motions to compel discovery; (iv) all but one of the multiple motions in limine; (v) from the trial 
court's order denying Appellants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the 
Alternative for New Trial; and, (vi) from the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to 
Respondents. 2 Instead, Appellants attack discrete evidentiary issues in an effort to call into 
question the validity of the very findings it does not appeal: the jury verdict. In so doing, 
Appellants ignore the standard of review that must guide this Court in its review of the issues 
that are presented. Moreover, Appellants fail to support the majority of their arguments with 
2 The trial court's written and verbal orders on these motions may be found in the record as follows: 
(1) Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment - R., p. 000264-267; 
(2) Order Granting Counterclaimant's Motion to Amend and Denying Motion to Amend to Include Punitive 
Damages R., p. 000318-320; 
(3) Order Granting [second motion for] Partial Summary Judgment R., p. 000339-341; Hr'g July 7,2011, Ht'g Tr., 
p. 43, 1. II p. 65, 1. 23; 
(4) Memorandum Decision re: Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment R., p. 000355-359; 
(5) Motions in limine, in pertinent part, Hrg January 19,2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 126-172; 
(6) Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion for JNOV and New Trial- R., p, 000787-796; Tr., Vol. I, p. 305 
p. 336; and, 
(7) Memorandum Decision and Order re Attorney Fees R., p. 000797-807. 
2 
cogent authority or analysis, but instead ask the court to weigh the evidence and to second guess 
the jury and trial judge. 
Appellants also raise several issues in their notices of appeal which are wholly omitted 
from Appellants' Brief, namely: 
3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it entered declaratory 
judgments on Counts 1, 2, and 3 of Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint; 
4. Whether there was good cause to exclude 
Defendants/Counterclaimants' expert witnesses or did Plaintiffs 
Counsel's comments affect the substantial rights of the 
Defendants/Counterclaimants; 
6. Whether the verdict was in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence; and 
7. Whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
R., p. 000782-786; R, p. 000823-827; and R., p. 001204-1207; cf Appellants Brief. 
As noted by this Court in City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d 232 
(2013), the Court "will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by propositions 
of law, authority or argument.' " Id. at 237 (quoting Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 60, 244 
P.3d 197, 204 (201O))Error! Bookmark not defined .. "Put another way, even if "an issue is 
explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only 
mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be 
considered by this Court.' " Id. (quoting Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696,698 
(2010))Error! Bookmark not defined.. As to the foregoing issues on appeal, Appellants 
3 
provide no briefing and no authority which would enable meaningful review of these issues and 
further consideration by this Court is therefore unnecessary. 
In addition, to the extent Appellants now challenge the failure of the trial court to give 
jury instructions, Appellants did not request the jury instructions they now claim were refused 
and further failed to object to the lack of the same. Consequently, issues with respect to jury 
instructions upon fraud and constructive fraud have not been preserved for appeal. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter relates to an investment company known as Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, 
LP, a Delaware limited partnership, which specializes in investments relating to precious metals, 
like gold and silver. R., p. 000026. The principal place of business for Dollars and Sense is in 
Idaho. R., Ex., p. 001509. Dollars and Sense not only invests in and purchases precious metals, 
but also takes possession and arranges for the storage of such precious metals in vaults 
specifically designed for the same with all the requisite modem security features. R., p. 000027. 
The precious metals are stored in facilities located in Idaho. R., p. 000053. 
The investors are the limited partners of Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000053. Dollars and 
Sense has one general partner, namely Profits Plus Capital Management, L.L.C., a Delaware 
limited liability company. R., p. 000053. Robert Coleman resides in Idaho and is the sole 
member and manager of Profits Plus. R., p. 000053. The general partner, Profits Plus, is only 
entitled to receive from Dollars and Sense a management fee and some incentive fees. R., p. 
4 
000053. All other profits, losses, and revenues generated by Dollars and Sense are distributed or 
allocated solely to the limited partners based upon their investments. R., p. 000053. 
Robert Coleman is a registered investment advisor and holds multiple securities licenses 
which are regulated both by Securities and Exchange CommissionlFINRA and the Idaho 
Department of Finance. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 440, 1. 23 - p. 446, 1. 20. These licenses allow Mr. 
Coleman, through Profits Plus, to collect management and incentive fees for the management of 
Dollars and Sense. Tr., Vol 2, p. 440, 1. 23 - p. 446, 1. 20. 
Jeffrey Podesta is the sole member and manager of Street Search, LLC. R., p. 000037. 
Jeffrey Podesta is a New Jersey resident and Street Search, LLC is a New Jersey limited liability 
company. R., p. 000037. Jeffrey Podesta, both individually and through Street Search, LLC, 
locates investors and raises capital for investment opportunities. R., p. 000110. At all times 
material hereto, Jeffrey Podesta was an independent contractor for Schafer-Cullen Capital in 
New York, New York where he solicits and markets investors. Tr., Vol. 2., p. 898, 11. 7-24; p. 
903,11. 2-13; R., p. 000111. Jeffrey Podesta does not hold any current securities licenses and is 
not a registered investment advisor. Tr. Vol. 2, p., 907, 11. 8-19. 
In late 2008 and early 2009, Robert Coleman contacted Jeffrey Podesta to discuss 
marketing Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000037; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 499, 1. 8 p. 502,1. 7. Jeffrey Podesta 
was interested in the concept of the precious metals market and felt that he, with his experience 
in raising capital, and Robert Coleman, with his knowledge of the precious metals market, would 
make a great combination. Tr.,Vo1. 2, p. 908, 1. - 910, 1. 10. In late April or early May, 2009, 
Robert Coleman and Jeffrey Podesta traveled to New York, New York, to meet with various 
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individuals, including an attorney, to discuss the formation of a new entity, an open-ended 
mutual fund consistent with the Limited Partnership, but not limited by the same securities 
regulations. R., p. 000247-48; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 918, 1. 11- p. 919, p. 12; R., p., 000113-115, R., p. 
000112-113; R., Ex., p. 000758-767, 000768-771. Following these meetings, the parties agreed 
that the new fund idea was too expensive to pursue Tr., Vol. 2, p. 918, 1. 11- p. 919, 1. 12; R., p. 
000114. From here, the parties disagree on the material terms of any alleged agreement and 
whether an agreement was ever reached. 
In order to market the services and benefits of Dollars and Sense, Profits Plus claimed 
that no contract existed, or if a contract existed, it was an independent contractor consulting 
agreement with Street Search and/or Jeffrey Podesta. R., p. 000027-28. To better enable Jeffrey 
Podesta and Street Search to market Dollars and Sense, in August 2008, Robert Coleman added 
Jeffrey Podesta as an Executive Officer of Dollars and Sense. R., Ex., p. 001545-1552; Tr., VoL 
2, p. 551, L 13 - p. 552, 1. 7; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 806, 1. 16-p. 807, 1. 15. In addition, the name of 
Dollars and Sense was amended to Street Search Dollars and Sense upon Mr. Podesta's claim 
that it would better enable Street Search and Mr. Podesta to market Dollars and Sense.3 Id. 
3 Apart from the change in name, no substantive alterations were made to the Limited Partnership Agreement. R., 
Ex., p. 001507-28; cf. R., Ex., p. 000527-548; See also R., Ex., p. 000919. Pursuant to the Amended Limited 
Partnership Agreement, the sole General Partner remained Profits Plus. !d., p. 1509. Further, the principal place of 
business of the Partnership remained as 704 13th Ave. South, Nampa, Idaho. Jd; See also R., Ex., p. 001454-1506 
and 000629-681. At no time was Street Search, LLC or Jeffrey Podesta ever included as a member, manager, or 
owner upon the documentation filed with the departments of finance, tax, corporate, or any regulatory authorities. 
See R., Ex., p. 000549-000575 (LP Subscription documents for Dollars and Sense; Confidential Private Offering 
Memorandum for Dollars and Sense dated November 1,2007); R., Ex., p. 000576-628 (Dollars and Sense Amended 
and Restated Confidential Private Offering Memorandum); R., Ex., p. 000629-681 (Street Search Dollars and Sense 
Growth Fund, LP, Confidential Private Offering Memorandum dated August 1, 2009); R., Ex., p. 000682-734 
(Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP Confidential Private Offering Memorandum). 
6 
Over the course of 2009, Dollars and Sense paid to Street Search varying amounts for 
what Respondents believed to be advances for marketing services. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 591, 1. 21 - p. 
593, 1. 17; p. 595, 1. 22-p. 598, 1. 17. Profits Plus issued an independent contractor 1099 tax form 
to Street Search for the advances it paid. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 597, 1. 19-p. 598, 1. 10. Ultimately, 
however, Street Search failed to identify or to bring-in a single investor to Dollars and Sense. Tr., 
Vol. 2, p. 821,1. 1- p. 823,1. 22. Instead, Profits Plus through Robert Coleman, generated one 
very significant client, Philip Wrigley, who invested in the fund after he "read an article Robert 
Coleman wrote on precious metals, investing in- in storage." R., Ex., 001059, 11. 13-22; p. 1062, 
1. 21 - p. 1064,1. 7; p. 1066,1. 17- p. 1069,1. 8. 
On March 5, 2010, Jeffrey Podesta's attorney contacted Robert Coleman to assert an 
ownership interest in the Limited Partnership. R., p. 000038. Jeffrey Podesta further averred 
that the agreement between the parties was not a consulting agreement, but, rather, in exchange 
for Mr. Podesta's services, Street Search, LLC, was promised a 50% ownership interest in the 
limited partnership, Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000037. 
On July 22, 2010, Respondents filed their Verified Complaint for declaratory judgment. 
R., p. 000025-30. Following entry of an Order Allowing Default, on October 12, 2010, 
Appellants filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction. R., p. 000033-35, 
R., p. 000036-43. On December 17, 2010, the trial court entered its Memorandum Opinion and 
Order re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, denying Appellants' motion. R., p. 000070-78. 
On February 22, 2011, Appellants filed their Answer to Complaint, Counterclaims and 
Demand for Jury Trial. R., p. 000079-100. Therein, Appellants assert a claim of ownership in 
7 
Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000084-93. Appellants further aver that Mr. Podesta traveled to Idaho 
during 2009 in the furtherance of that claim. R., p. 000081; R., p. 000087. Appellants were 
permitted to amend their Counterclaim to assert additional claims against Respondents but were 
denied in their request to amend the Counterclaim to assert a claim for punitive damages. R., p. 
000318-320. The majority of Appellants' counterclaims were dismissed pursuant to 
Respondents' motions for summary judgment. R., p. 000264-267; R., p. 000339-341; Hr'g July 
7, 2011, Hr'g Tr., p. 43, l. 11 - p. 65, l. 23. Individual claims asserted by Appellant Jeffrey 
Podesta were dismissed prior to trial. Id. 
The case therefore went to trial upon Appellant Street Search's claim that it had a 
contract with Profits Plus for 50% ownership in Dollars and Sense. In addition, Street Search 
claimed that it believed it had a contract for 50% ownership in Dollars and Sense and, if it did 
not, Street Search and Coleman committed acts of fraud or constructive fraud. In addition, Street 
Search asserted a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based upon the existence of the contract it 
alleged existed between the parties. R., p. 000295-317. Street Search did not request a jury 
instruction upon its fraud and constructive fraud claims and did not object to the lack thereof. 
On February 17,2012, the jury unanimously decreed that Street Search had failed to establish the 
existence of a contract between the parties. R.,p. 000697-700. 
Following entry of the jury verdict, Respondents timely moved for an award of attorney 
fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. R., P 
000797-807. Contrary to Appellants claim that the trial court denied "Coleman's attorney fees 
request in its entirety" the majority of Respondents' claimed attorney fees were granted. 
8 
Appellants' Brief, p. 12; R., p 000797-807. Appellants do not appeal the award ofattomey fees. 
Appellants' post-trial motion to dismiss Jeffrey Podesta, as well as Appellants' motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial, were all denied. R., p. 000738-740, Tr., 
Vol. 1, p. 273-301; R., p.000787-796; Tr. Vol. 1,305-336; Hr'g Oct. 11,2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 73-
110. 
IV. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether there was personal jurisdiction over Jeffrey Podesta in Idaho 
2. Whether there was personal jurisdiction over Street Search, LLC in Idaho 
3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it entered declaratory judgments on Counts 1,2, and 
3 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint* 
4. Whether there was good cause to exclude Defendants/Counterclaimants' expert witnesses 
or did Plaintiffs Counsel's comments affect the substantial rights of the 
Defendants/ Counterclaimants * 
5. Whether there were evidentiary errors at trial that denied Jeffrey Podesta and Street 
Search a fair trial 
6. Whether the verdict was in accord with the clear weight of the evidence* 
7. Whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict* 
8. Whether the Appellants are entitled to atty fees on appeal 
9. Whether court erred when it denied Appellants' motion for new trial according to 60(b) 
R., p. 000823-827;R., p. 001205. 
Issues denoted by an asterisk were not briefed by Appellants. Pursuant to their briefing, 
Appellants now assert the following additional issues upon appeal: 
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1. Trial Court committed plain error when it dismissed Appellants fraud and constructive 
fraud claims; 
2. Trial Court erred when it refused to instruct the Jury regarding promissory estoppel 
Appellants' Brief, p. 2. 
V. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Respondents are entitled to their costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Personal Jurisdiction. 
A. Standard of Review. 
"The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is 
one of law, which this Court reviews freely." Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 
1024,1026 (2005) (citing McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491, 50 P.3d 983, 986 (2002) 
(citations omitted)). "When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction, 
this Court applies the same standard as when we review appeals from orders of summary 
judgment; we construe the evidence presented to the district court in favor of the party opposing 
the order and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drawn." 
!d. (citing Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 978, 980-81 
(1990) (citing Intermountain Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Bus. Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 540, 
531 P.2d 1183,1185 (1975)). Thus in reviewing the district court's denial of Appellants' motion 
to dismiss, the Court construes the evidence in favor of Respondents. See Id. 
B. Appellants fall within Idaho's long-arm statute, Idaho Code § 5-514. 
"For an Idaho court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, two 
criteria must be met; the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of our 
long-arm statute and the constitutional standards of due process must be met." McAnally, 137 
Idaho at 491, 50 P.3d at 986 (citing St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. State of Washington, 123 
Idaho 739, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (1993) (citations omitted)). 
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Here, the district court held, not once, but twice, that its exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over Appellants, Jeffrey Podesta and Street Search, LLC was proper under Idaho's long-arm 
statute, Idaho Code § 5-514, which provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over claims arising 
out of a defendant's contacts with Idaho. R., p. 000070-78, Tr. Vol. 1., p. 285, 1. 6-9. Western 
States Equip. Co., v. American Amex, Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158,868 P.2d 483,486 (1994). Idaho 
Code § 5-514, provides, in pertinent part: 
Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or 
not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an 
agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits 
said person, firm, company, association or corporation, and if an 
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing 
of any of said acts: 
(a) The transaction of any business within this state which is 
hereby defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing 
pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, 
transact or enhance the business purpose or objective or any part 
thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation; 
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate 
within this state; 
I.C. § 5-514. "The long-arm statute should be liberally construed." Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 
148,151,124 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2005) (citingPurco Fleet Servs., Inc., v. Dept. of Fin., 140 Idaho 
121,123,90 P.3d 346, 348 (2004) (citations omitted). "Moreover, Idaho's long-arm statute is co-
extensive with all of the jurisdiction available to this state under the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution." !d. (citing Houghland Farms, Inc., 119 Idaho at 75, 803 P.2d at 
981). 
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On December 17, 2010, the trial court entered its first Memorandum Decision and Order 
re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R., p. 000070-78. Therein, the trial court made the following 
factual findings: 
1. [Appellants] have asserted an ownership interest worth 
upwards of $1 ,000,000 in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus. 
2. Profits Plus and Coleman have filed an action in Idaho 
seeking a declaratory judgment that Podesta and Street Search 
have no ownership interest in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus. 
3. [Appellant], Jeffrey Podesta, visited Idaho on at least one 
occasion to view facilities that would be used to store precious 
metals owned by a the business entity at issue. He worked on 
marketing presentations for potential investors and contacted 
potential investors. 
R., p. 000071-72; R., p. 000037. These findings are consistent with the Affidavit of Jeffrey 
Podesta wherein Mr. Podesta claimed that his company, Street Search, LLC was a 50% owner in 
the fund; that he personally agreed to act as President and CEO of the fund; that he traveled to 
Idaho in 2009 as the President and CEO of the fund, to meet with Robert Coleman and to see the 
storage facility where the fund stored precious metals purchased by its limited partners. R., p. 
000037-38. 
Appellants do not appear to challenge the trial court's factual findings other than to state 
that "Respondents failed to prove that Appellants were conducting business in Idaho." 
Appellants' Brief, p. 14. First, as noted above, the trial court was constrained to view all 
inferences in favor of Respondents. Next, as noted by the district court, there were ample facts 
supporting its decision that Appellants' activities fell within the ambit of Idaho Code § 5-514. 
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Appellants were claiming a significant pecuniary interest in a limited partnership, the principal 
place of business for which was Idaho. See R., Ex., p. 001507-28, R., Ex., p. 000527-548; R., 
Ex., p. 000549-000575; R., Ex., p. 000576-628; R., Ex., p. 000629-681; R., Ex., p. 000682-734; 
R., Ex., p. 001454-1506 and 000629-681.4 This pecuniary interest was not limited to the time 
Jeffrey Podesta traveled to Idaho, but based upon Appellants' own claims, "had the relationship 
continued, and if, as alleged, Podesta is indeed a 50% owner of Dollars and Sense, he would, and 
will, of necessity have ongoing contact with Idaho. " R., p. 000076. As noted by the trial court, 
"If he [Jeffrey Podesta] was to be President and CEO of the fund, he is certainly purposefully 
availing himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum where the only tangible 
assets and activities of the fund are located." R., p. 000076. 
Moreover, the present claim that "neither Podesta nor Street Search was in any manner 
conducting business with the LP by asserting an ownership interest in the fund" is unsupported 
by any fact or law. Appellants' Brief, p. 16. Appellants admittedly traveled to Idaho "for the 
purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or 
enhance the business purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, 
association or corporation": Street Search, LLC, in the furtherance of a claim of ownership in the 
LP; and, Jeffrey Podesta in the furtherance of his claim that he was the President and CEO of the 
4 Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP filed its Amendment to Certificate of Registration of Limited Partnership with 
the State ofldaho on December 13,2010. It is undisputed that Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, was properly 
registered with the Idaho Secretary of State prior to the date Appellants filing their Answer to Complaint, 
Counterclaims and Demand for Jury Trial on February 22, 2011. Appellants filed their second Motion to Dismiss 
Jeffrey Podesta on March 5,2012. Again, the claim that that LP was no properly registered in Idaho as of2009 was 
not raised or supported. See R., p. 0000712. 
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LP. See I.e. § 5-514. The trial court properly determined that Appellants' activities fell within 
Idaho's long-arm statute. 
Appellants filed a second motion to dismiss only as to Jeffrey Podesta, an individual, 
following the trial of this matter. At that time, Appellants specifically stated that they were "not 
asking to dismiss Street Search." Tr, Vol 1, p. 275, 1. 16.5 In denying Appellants' (second) 
motion to dismiss Jeffrey Podesta, the trial court held: 
Mr. Podesta was out here not just on behalf of Street Search; he 
was out here on his own hook. He was claimed to be an executive 
officer of this company. You're correct that it was not an Idaho-
formed company, that it was -- or an LLC, whatever it was. It was 
in Delaware. But the fact of the matter was that this is -- the 
operations were here, the physical assets were here, the actions 
taking place here. For the very reasons I held in the first place, I 
think the court had jurisdiction. ... I still find that jurisdiction 
existed because he was here and he was making those claims based 
on his conduct in Idaho. He lost them, but he had activities, 
business activities, within the state of Idaho, and he had claims, 
tort claims, that he was pursuing within the state of Idaho " .his 
conduct overall was on his own behalf; not just on behalf of Street 
Search. So the motion will be denied. 
Tr. Vol. 1., p. 285, 1. 6-9. The factual record upon which the Court relied in finding that Jeffrey 
Podesta's activities fell within Idaho's long-arm statute were compelling: Mr. Podesta testified: 
And I had to make sure, as the president of the fund, that when I 
got out of there, there was a storage situation and that there was the 
ability to handle money, handle the stuff. And if we were going to 
go to other prospects, if we were going to go to other situations, we 
needed to be sure and I had to be convinced that we had the proper 
storage facility. So, with Mr. Wrigley being, in my estimation, a 
5 Having filed a Counterclaim and taken the position, after trial, that jurisdiction was proper over Street Search, 
LLC, it seems rather axiomatic that Appellants now seek to take the position that jurisdiction was not proper as to 
Street Search, LLC. 
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very good possible client, it was critical - if we wanted to add 
money to his existing account, we had to make sure that our 
product was tight, it was in good shape, and could move forward. 
So that was the reason I started to go to, actually, the Idaho 
location first and then to make sure things were in order and then 
to come to Arizona so that I could, in good conscience, meet with 
Mr. Wrigley. Bob could make the presentation and the 
representation that Street Search Dollar and Sense Fund could 
move forward, handle critical size. And that was really what was 
gomg on. 
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 941,1. 11 - p. 942, 1. 8. During Appellants' visit to Idaho, Mr. Podesta viewed the 
vault where the precious metals purchased by the LP were stored "to make sure that the vaulting 
capability could sustain a lot of growth"; he visited with Corky Gowans regarding current and 
future storage possibilities in Idaho; and, met with Nick Barber with Idaho Bank Corp., 
regarding potential financing for a new vault storage facility.6 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 959, 1. 2 - p. 962,1. 
10. The trial judge correctly determined, twice, that Idaho's long-arm statute was applicable to 
Appellants' actions. 
C. The trial court correctly concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did 
not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In denying Appellants' motions to dismiss, the trial court further found that the exercise 
of jurisdiction over both Appellants arose out of Appellants' contacts with Idaho, that it did not 
violate the Due Process Clause, that Appellants had sufficient minimum contacts with Idaho, and 
6 "Now the Garda Vault, as I understand it, was where the Street Search Dollar 
and Sense Fund kept its - stored its investments; is that correct? A. Right. Q. And 
you were also looking for vault space; is that correct, as well? A. That's correct." 
Tr., Vol. 2, p. P. 961, 1. 21 - p. 962, 1. 3. 
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that Appellants had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in 
Idaho. R., p. 000074-77. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits a 
state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 
when that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316,66 S.Ct. 154, 158,90 L.Ed. 95, 
101-02 (1945). In determining the existence of minimum contacts, 
a court must focus on the relationship among the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,204,97 
S.Ct. 2569,2579-80,53 L.Ed.2d 683, 697-98 (1977). Once a court 
finds the requisite minimum contacts, it must then proceed to 
determine whether its assertion of personal jurisdiction comports 
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184, 
85 L.Ed.2d 528, 543 (1985). 
Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 727, 152 P.3d 594, 598 (2007). Here, the 
trial court properly analyzed each of the foregoing factors: 
The underlying dispute in this case is the terms and conditions of a 
contract for consulting services. Specifically, at issue is whether 
Plaintiff Coleman agreed to transfer 50% ownership interest in 
Dollars and Sense to Podesta in exchange for Podesta's marketing 
services. The negotiations underlying the parties' contract were 
apparently done entirely without either individual leaving his 
respective state. The contract concerns a company located in 
Idaho. The only physical activity of the dispute company is storage 
of precious metals. That activity is carried out in Idaho. Podesta's 
one trip to Idaho was in furtherance of that activity. His visit, it can 
be inferred, was to better enable him to market the fund. Given his 
involvement with prospective purchase of real estate by the fund, I 
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also infer his involvement in management during the brief duration 
of the business relationship, went beyond simply marketing. 
Had the relationship continued, and if, as alleged, Podesta IS 
indeed a 50% owner of Dollars and Sense, he would, and will, of 
necessity have ongoing contact with Idaho. If he was to be 
President and CEO of the fund, he is certainly purposefully 
availing himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the 
form where the only tangible assets and activities of the fund are 
located. 
R., p. 000076. The trial court thus concluded that "the claim [by Podesta and Street Search] 
arises from the claimed ownership of the Idaho based company/partnership. It arises directly 
from the defendants' forum based activities." R., p. 000077; Houghland Farms, Inc., v. Johnson, 
119 Idaho 72, 75, 803 P.2d 978, 981 (1990). Further, that, "[w]here Appellant Street Search, 
LLC] claims ownership of an Idaho business and [Appellant Jeffrey Podesta] claims entitlement 
to the office of President and CEO of that business, it is hardly unfair to require him to defend a 
suit over that ownership and title in Idaho." R., p. 000077; Houghland, 119 Idaho at 75-76, 803 
P .2d at 981-982. The trial court correctly determined that these facts established ample 
minimum contacts with Idaho. 
The due process analysis is a two-step process. Once a court 
determines that the requisite minimum contacts with the forum 
state exist, the court must then consider the contacts in light of 
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 315,66 S.Ct. 154, 158,90 L.Ed. 95,102 (1945) (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 
278, 283 (1940». See Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 76, 803 
P.2d at 982. This analysis permits the court to consider: 
[1] "the burden on the defendant," 
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[2] "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," 
[3] "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief," 
[ 4] "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies," and 
[5] the "shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies." 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. at 2184,85 L.Ed.2d at 543 
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. at 
564, 62 L.Ed.2d at 498). See Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 76, 
803 P.2d at 982. 
Western States, 125 Idaho at 158-159,868 P.2d at 486-487. 
Apart from arguing a strained and inaccurate interpretation of the factual record, 
Appellants do not appear to disagree with the trial court's factual findings and instead suggest 
only that "asserting jurisdiction under these facts violates due process." Appellants' Brief, p. 19. 
In substantive part, Appellants contend that due process was violated because it was unfair to 
make Appellants' travel to Idaho to defend this case (as opposed to Delaware - where 
incidentally, Appellants would also have to travel to defend the case and where neither party ever 
actually traveled - thus making Appellants' claim that Delaware is more appropriate than Idaho 
more than dubious); that there is no interest for Idaho in this matter (despite the fact that the 
principal place of business for the LP is in Idaho, that Robert Coleman is an Idaho resident and 
Profits Plus is an Idaho limited liability company, that all assets of the LP are here in Idaho, and 
that the LP is regulated by the Idaho Department of Finance); and that Respondents "should not 
be inconvenienced" by litigating this case on the East Coast as the LP is a Delaware partnership 
(Appellants themselves had no contact with Delaware thus rendering the argument that Delaware 
19 
was a more appropriate forum nonsensical); and finally, that the most efficient resolution of the 
parties' disputes involved residences or entities related to states on the east coast would appear to 
be on the east coast (except that this case does not involve a dispute over any "residences," only 
three entities, two of which are principally based in Idaho.) Appellants' Brief, p. 18-19. 
As noted by the trial court, "the claim [by Podesta and Street Search] arises from the 
claimed ownership of the Idaho based company/partnership. It arises directly from the 
defendants' forum based activities." R., p. 000077. Further, that, "[w]here [Appellant Street 
Search, LLC] claims ownership of an Idaho business and [Appellant Jeffrey Podesta] claims 
entitlement to the office of President and CEO of that business, it is hardly unfair to require him 
to defend a suit over that ownership and title in Idaho." R., p. 000077. The trial court's findings 
are consistent with the evidentiary record and Idaho law. The trial court therefore properly 
denied Appellants' motion to dismiss - both of them. 
D. Appellants waived their right to contest personal jurisdiction when they filed their 
Counterclaims. 
Rule 4(i)(2), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to defend an action without 
constituting a voluntary appearance. LR.C.P. 4(i)(2). It may not, however, permit the filing of an 
affirmative counterclaim without constituting a voluntary appearance. Here, Appellants sought 
to invoke the jurisdiction of this court in order to pursue affirmative claims for relief against 
Respondents.7 See e.g., Grange Ins. Assoc., v. State, 110 Wash.2d 752,757 P.2d 933 (1988). 
7 The Court: "You're getting two bites of the apple, 'Gee Whiz, I can go ahead and try it, and ifI lose it, I could still 
go back to New Jersey and try it again. But if I win it, I can go ahead and claim the fruits of my victory in Idaho." 
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 281, I. 17-25. 
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II. Trial Court Acted Within the Bounds of its Discretion in Denying 
Appellants' Motion for a New Trial 
A. Standard of Review 
A trial court's decision whether to grant relief pursuant to LR.C.P. 
60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be 
upheld if it appears that the trial court (1) correctly perceived the 
issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards, and 
(3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason. 
A determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of 
fact to be determined by the trial court. Those factual findings will 
be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. If the trial court 
applies the facts in a logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 
60(b), while keeping in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful 
cases, the court will be deemed to have acted within its discretion. 
[Waller v. State, Department of Health and Welfare] 146 Idaho 
234, 237-38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061-62 (2008) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) .... Although courts have broad 
discretion in granting or denying such motions, that discretion is 
bounded by the requirement that the party seeking relief 
demonstrate "unique and compelling circumstances" which justify 
relief. [Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 
(1996).] 
It is incumbent upon a party seeking relief from a judgment not 
only to meet the requirements of LR.C.P. 60(b), but also to show, 
plead or present evidence of facts which, if established, would 
constitute a meritorious defense to the action. This policy 
recognizes that it would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial 
resources for a court to set aside a judgment if, in fact, there is no 
genuine justiciable controversy. Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. 
Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 P.2d 663,670 (Ct.App.1994). 
Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 274 P.3d 589, 591 (2011.) 
In so far as a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3) is made, "[o]ur Supreme Court 
has stated that 'fraud,' for the purposes of this rule, requires more than interparty misconduct-it 
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will be found only in the presence of such "tampering with the administration of justice as to 
suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.' " Artiach 
Trucking, Inc. v. Wolters, 118 Idaho 656, 658, 798 P.2d 938, 940 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 
Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980); See also Win ofMich., 
Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d 330, 337 (2002) (upholding district 
court's determination that "there had been no material misrepresentation of the corporation's 
worth" which finding was supported by the evidence and was therefore not clearly erroneous.); 
See also Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) (holding insufficient the 
argument that plaintiff had committed fraud by making false statements in affidavits because 
"[n]one of the statements, even if false, constitute such tampering with the administration of 
justice as to suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public." 
Id.). 
As regards a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), "although the court is vested with 
broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is 
limited and [the motion] may be granted only on a showing of 'unique and compelling 
circumstances' justifying relief." Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380, 234 
P.3d 699, 704 (2010) (citing Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996) 
(quoting In re Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093,793 P.2d 1263,1265 (Ct.App.1990)). 
Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the moving party to "demonstrate unique and compelling 
circumstances justifying relief." Maynard, 152 Idaho 724, 274 P.3d at 592. Moreover, as noted 
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above, the moving party "must allege facts which, if proven true, would constitute a meritorious 
defense."!d. As noted by the Court in Maynard, 
A detennination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of 
facts to be detennined by the trial court. Those factual findings will 
be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. "If the trial court 
applies the facts in a logical manner to the criteria set forth in a 
logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keeping 
in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will 
be deemed to have acted within its discretion." 
Id., 274 P.3d at 596 (citing Dawson, 149 Idaho at 380, 234 P.3d at 704 (quoting Waller, 146 
Idaho at 237-38, 192 P.3d at 1061-62)). Furthennore, that "where a district court grants relief 
that is inconsistent with the pleadings and evidence in the case, such fact "may constitute unique 
and compelling circumstances sufficient to justify relief under LR.C.P. 60(b)(6).' " Id. (quoting 
Dawson, 149 Idaho at 380,234 P.3d at 704 
B. The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in denying Appellants' 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6), Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Following entry of the jury verdict in favor of Respondents, Appellants filed two motions 
for a new trial. R., p. 000701-704; R., p. 000828. The trial court entered its Memorandum 
Decision and Order denying Appellants first motion for a new trial and judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on June 8, 2012. R., p. 000787-796. Appellants now challenge the 
trial court's denial of its second motion for a new trial, made pursuant to Rules 60(b)(3) and (6), 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, filed August 14, 2012. Appellants' Brief, p. 19; R., p. 000828-
83l. This second motion came on for hearing on October 1, 2012, was denied by oral order of 
the trial court on October 25,2012, and by written order of the trial court on November 6,2012. 
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R., p. 001201-3; Hr'g October 1, 2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 73-103; Hr'g October 25,2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 
104-110. 
Appellants spend considerable time in their brief to re-argue their characterization of the 
evidence. Appellants Brief, p. 19-25. These same arguments were considered and properly 
rejected by the trial court. Hr'g October 1, 2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 73-103; Hr'g October 25, 2012, 
Hr' g Tr., p. 104-110. The trial court considered Appellants' arguments, recognized that it 
perceived the issue as discretionary, and acted within the bounds of its discretion when it 
concluded that the issue was more properly framed as a discovery dispute which could and 
should have been asserted prior to the trial. Hr' g October 25, 2012, Hr' g Tr., p. 104-110. In 
particular, the court criticized the broad nature of the discovery request at issue by Appellants' 
motion and noted that, had the issue been raised prior to the trial, there was an argument to be 
made both ways: both for an order compelling Respondents to respond, but also an argument that 
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the information complained of was beyond the scope of the written request. 8 Jd., at p. 106-107. 
Either way, the trial court determined that the dispute could and should have been raised prior to 
trial if Appellants truly believed that the information was responsive to their request: 
"it's not the kind of request I would order sanctions for failing to 
produce it. I don't think it's that clear. And on top of that, aside 
from the fact no one came to me at the time and asked me to do it, 
what happened - and, again, that's the problem sometimes with 
overly broad discovery requests ... Nobody squawked. Nobody 
followed up and said, wait a minute, I asked for all 
correspondence. I didn't ask for the FINRA report. Fine. Give me 
the FINRA report, but I want all correspondence with the 
Department of Finance. It doesn't - the interrogatory phrased 
doesn't say all correspondence within the Department of Finance, 
it just says all correspondence related [to the issuance 
revocation and/or suspension of any such licenses, and the 
reinstatement, if applicable] ... " 
Hr'g October 25,2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 107,11.5-24. 
The trial court did expressly or impliedly not condone or promote discovery abuses. 
Appellants Brief, p., 26-27. The trial court simply found that there were none. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 104-
8 By its Motion for a New Trial, Appellants contend that Respondents' response to Request for Production No. 27 
was inaccurate and was fraudulent. In order to make this argument, Appellants strain the literal language of the 
request for production which stated, in its entirety, "Please provide each and every document relating to the issuance 
of any professional, broker, and/or securities licenses to Robert Coleman or Profits Plus, the revocation and/or 
suspension of any such licenses, and the reinstatement, if applicable, if any such licenses." R., p. 000840. In 
response, Respondents produced documents obtained from FINRA which contained the dates of issuance, 
revocation, or expiration of Plaintiffs' licenses, any complaints or disciplinary history, and the current status thereof 
R., p. 001014-1152. Marilyn Chastain with the Idaho Department of Finance stated "[i]t is my understanding that, 
to the extent a registered investment advisor has reportable disciplinary history, the same would be included in a 
FINRA BrokerCheck Report, which is available to the general public upon a public records request. Additional 
details on disciplinary actions, not generally available to the public, are available pursuant to a FINRA Snapshot 
report regularly generated and maintained by FINRA as the national clearinghouse on disciplinary issues relating to 
licenses of various licenses issued related to securities and investment advice." R., p. 001155,,5. Here, the FINRA 
Snapshot report was produced to Appellants. In response to a nearly identical request for production to Appellants, 
Appellants interpreted the request to include only the Broker Check report generally available to the public. R., p. 
00 I 016, '5, p. 1136-1152. Incidentally, Jeffrey Podesta's Broker Check report did disclose disciplinary history. R., 
p. 1142-1151. Consequently, it seems more than disingenuous for Appellants to now argue that the discovery 
request at issue encompassed documents which Appellants themselves saw no reason to produce or to compel the 
production of 
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110. Respondents believed that they had provided all information required by Appellants, 
especially given the fact that Appellants had actually provided less information in response to a 
nearly identical request for production. R., p. 001015-16. When asked to provide 
correspondence to or from the Idaho Department of Finance, Kurt Merritt, it is undisputed that 
Respondents fully complied. R., p. 1097-1135. 9 Consequently, the claim that Respondents 
intentionally withheld relevant evidence is patently without factual support. The trial court acted 
within the bounds of its discretion when it denied Appellants' motion' for a new trial upon this 
basis. 
Moreover, the remainder of Appellants' argument in this respect assume acts of 
intentional discovery abuse which Appellants simply cannot support. There remains no proof 
that Mr. Coleman was anything other than honest and accurate when he stated "I don't have any 
client complaints on my record. I have a very clean and honest record." Tr., Vol. 2, p. 456, II. 2-
6. Similarly, the statement that Mr. Coleman has never had a "regulatory authority in any way 
sanction [him], fine [him], suspend [him] in anything" remains undisputedly accurate. Tr., Vol. 
2, p. 876, 11. 8-17; R., p. 001155, ~ 5, R., p. 001053-56 (Snapshot disciplinary history). 
Similarly, Appellants' reliance upon State ex reI. Symms v. V-J Oil Co., 94 Idaho 456, 
490 P.2d 323 (1971) for the proposition that once fraud is established, the damages are 
presumed, is inapposite. The undisputed record before this Court establishes that Appellants 
9 See also R., p. 00 I 0 16, ~4, p. 1068 (Please produce a copy of all documents which reflect communications, 
including but not limited to, correspondence, e-mails, letters, and or telephone records, between any of the Plaintiffs 
and Kurt Merritt (an Idaho Department of Finance employee). Respondents fully complied with this request R., p. 
1097-1135. The separate request for correspondence with one individual employed by the Idaho Department of 
Finance renders Appellants' current reading of Request for Production No. 27 untenable. 
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lack any proof of fraud or an intentional false statement. Consequently, and upon this basis, the 
trial court was well-within the bounds of its discretion in denying Appellants' motion for a new 
trial upon this basis pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3) which requires that Appellants establish "fraud, 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct." LR.C.P. 60(b)(3). The trial court found that Appellants 
failed to sustain this burden. Appellants do not now present even a marginally persuasive 
argument for a finding otherwise. 
Similarly, Appellants cannot support their argument for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
60(b)( 6), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and again, the trial court acted consistent with the 
bounds of its limited discretion in denying the motion for a new trial upon this basis. Dawson, 
149 Idaho at 380, 234 P.3d at 704. Rule 60(b)(6) permits the trial court to grant a new trial only 
on a showing of 'unique and compelling circumstances' justifying relief." Id. (citations omitted). 
In support of its argument for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), apart from acknowledging the 
"unique and compelling circumstance" standard, Appellants merely restate their argument with 
respect to their motion pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3). Appellants Brief, p. 30; See City of Meridian, 
154 Idaho 425,299 P.3d at 257 (The Court "will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not 
supported by propositions of law, authority or argument." (citing Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 
53,60,244 P.3d 197,204 (2010)). For the same reasons that Appellants are not entitled to relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3), Appellants cannot sustain their burden pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 6). 
Appellants' motion to dismiss was thus correctly denied. 
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III. The Trial Court Acted Within the Bounds of Discretion in Excluding 
Evidence of Settlement Negotiations. 
A. Standard of Review 
The Court reviews a trial court's decision admitting or excluding evidence under the 
abuse of discretion standard. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (2004) 
(citing Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45 P.3d 810 (2002) (citations omitted)). "The test for 
determining whether the district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court correctly 
perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id., 
(citing Sun Valley Shopping Center Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 
1000 (1991). 
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Respondents' motion in limine 
regarding the admissibility of an exhibit. "Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a 
motion in limine." Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16,25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005) 
(citing Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767, 86 P.3d 
475, 481 (2004)). "This Court reviews the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion in 
limine under an abuse of discretion standard." !d. (citations omitted). 
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B. Idaho Rule of Evidence was correctly applied by the trial court in ruling upon 
Respondents' motion in limine. 
Prior to trial, the trial court granted Respondents' motion in limine regarding settlement 
negotiations, and in particular, a document Appellants now label as "Exhibit E." Tr., Vol. 1., p. 
161,1. 22 - p. 170,1. 18. 10 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 408: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) 
accepting, offering, or promlsmg to accept, a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a 
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the 
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made 
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. 
I.R.E. 408. "Deciding whether a settlement agreement should be disclosed to a jury rests in the 
broad discretion of the trial court." Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'[ Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,57,995 
P.2d 816,827 (2000) (citing Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 335, 848 P.2d 387,393 (1992)). 
In addition, I.R.E. 403 protects against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, if it 
tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis. State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 873 P .2d 905 
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935, 115 S. Ct. 332, 130 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1994). This rule 
creates a balancing test. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,753 P.2d 1253 (1987). The trial 
judge must first measure the probative worth of the proposed evidence by focusing upon the 
degree of its relevance and materiality while considering the need for it on the issue on which it 
10 Appellants' Exhibit "E" does not appear in the record as such because Appellants never offered it as an exhibit. 
R., Exhibits 000001-3. Rather, the exhibit Appellants now claim was improperly excluded as Exhibit "E" appears 
only as a portion of an exhibit to an Affidavit of Kim Gourley, filed January 5, 2012. R., p. 000515 and is not 
marked with the "Exhibit E" sticker filed as an exhibit to Appellants' Brief. 
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is to be introduced. Id. The trial judge must then consider whether the evidence amounts to 
unfair prejudice. Id. 
C. The trial court properly excluded evidence of settlement negotiations. 
Appellants did not offer to attempt to offer "Exhibit E" during the trial of this matter. 
Exhibit List, 000001-3. 11 Notwithstanding, the offending document was excluded pursuant to 
the trial court's decision on Respondents' motion in limine. Tr., Vol. 1., p. 161, 1. 22 - p. 170, 1. 
18. The trial court, in grating Respondents' motion in limine pursuant to Rule 408, excluded 
only a discrete portion of the documents Respondents included in their motion. R., p. 00478-479, 
~5 and R., p. 000512-523. In particular, and pertinent to this appeal, the trial court excluded a 
proposed settlement agreement, signed by Robert Coleman, Profits Plus, and rejected by Jeffrey 
Podesta, Street Search. R., p. 000515, Tr., Vol. l., p. 169,1.. 2-15. The trial court, acting within 
its discretion, held: 
... Up through the e-mail of March 2nd at 6:23 p.m., from Podesta 
to Coleman, the call-me-in-the-moming e-mail, I don't see that as 
II In discussing the admissibility of Exhibit l::L Appellants' "Exhibit E" was raised and addressed as follows: 
Mr. Clark: It's our Exhibit E, Your Honor. 
The Court: Your Exhibit E? 
Mr. Clark. E as in Eric. This is what we contended was the offer and compromise, or the settlement, post settlement. 
The Court: Looks an awful lot like an offer to compromise a disputed matter to me, Mr. Clark. 
Mr. Clark: With regard to E, Your Honor? 
The Court: Yeah. 
Mr. Clark: Yeah, I'm not arguing E is not-
The Court: Well, E is part and parcel of the e-mail of March 2 - March 3 at 2:59 a.m. 
Mr. Clark. Well, I'm not - I don't-
The Court: I thought you were offering that. 
Mr. Clark: No, sir, I'm offering H. Yes, I am, I guess is what I'm saying. But ifrefers to he's not saying anything 
more than he did in the first - the very first e-mail other than he's attached a 
The Court: He's attached an agreement of settlement. It says, "To continue working with you, we need an 
agreement. Here is the agreement." And in that context, that is an offer to settle, would be my ruling. 
Mr. Clark: Okay. 
Tr., Vol. 2, p. 735, I. 3-p. 736, I. 4. 
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settlement negotlatIOns. It is a graphic example of the 
commencement of a dispute that was not apparent to anyone ... 
this tells us when the dispute started. What follows from that 
appears to be discussions of how we are going to resolve this 
dispute .... As I read the record at this point, this offer of, "Here is 
a new contract, sign it," is just that. It's an offer that's rejected 
and it's --- therefore would not be admissible. " 
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 168,1. II-p. 169,1. 4. 
Appellants contend that the document that the court determined to be an inadmissible 
offer of settlement was merely "an offer to modify an existing contract" and "LR.E. 408 should 
apply only where the parties are concluding their relationships and terminating their respective 
claims." Appellants Brief, p. 32, 33. Appellants provide no authority to support this issue and 
therefore, the Court need not consider it. City of Meridian, 154 Idaho 425,299 P.3d at 257. "We 
will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law, authority 
or argument." Id. (quoting Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 60, 244 P.3d 197, 204 (2010)). 
Similarly, Appellants' assertion that "Coleman offered no valuable consideration" is not 
supported by any citation to the record or to authority. Again, the Court need not consider an 
argument not supported by cogent argument or authority. City of Meridian, 154 Idaho 425, 299 
P.3d at 257 (citations omitted). Appellants' characterization of the evidence is of no assistance 
to this Court in determining whether the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in 
concluding that Respondents offer to settle a disputed claim was properly admissible pursuant to 
Rule 408. 
Finally, Appellants' overstate the prejudicial effect of the exclusion of the document 
Respondents now label as Exhibit E. Appellants were permitted to introduce Exhibits F, G, and 
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H, all of which were sent near or contemporaneous to "Exhibit E" and contained similar, if not 
duplicative statements. 12 The settlement agreement that Appellants now decree was so critical to 
their case, the exclusion of which deprived them of a fair trial, offered little, if anything, that was 
not presented to and rejected by the jury. See R., Ex., p. 001530-1533; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 719,1. 23-
p. 732, 1. 6. Appellants' claim that, as a result of the exclusion of Exhibit E and a portion of 
Exhibit H "Coleman was allowed to lie to the Jury about the true nature of the contractual 
relationship" is unsupported and is patently false. Appellants' Brief, p. 36. The parties presented 
differing interpretations of the nature and scope of the parties' agreement - Appellants were 
entitled to present their theory of the case and to cross-examine Respondents on theirs. See e.g., 
Tr., Vol 2, p. 718,1. 21- p. 755, 1. 7. The jury ultimately rejected Appellants' theory ofthe case. 
Appellants' claim that the exclusion of a single piece of evidence deprived Appellants of a fair 
trial is, in a word, meritless. 
To the extent Appellants now challenge the redaction of Exhibit H, Appellants do not 
direct the Court to any portion of the record or Exhibit H that they contend the trial court 
erroneously excluded. Again, the Court need not consider an argument not supported by cogent 
argument or authority. City oj Meridian, 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d at 257 (citations omitted). 
The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in excluding evidence of 
settlement negotiations. Appellants' appeal on this claim presents no cogent argument or 
authority otherwise. 
12 The Court and counsel's colloquy regarding these Exhibits, as well as Mr. Clark's cross-examination ofMr. 
Coleman with respect to the same appears in the record at Tr., Vol 2, p. 718, I. 21- p. 755, I. 7. 
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IV. The Issue of the Trial Court's Refusal to Instruct the Jury on Issues of 
Fraud and Constructive Fraud Claims was not Preserved for Appeal 
A. Standard of Review 
On appeal, the "Court exercises free review when determining whether the district court 
properly instructed the jury." Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937,943 (2007) 
(citing Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 27, 105 P.3d 676, 687 (2005)). 
"Regarding jury instructions, the standard of review is limited to a determination of whether the 
instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law. Id. (quoting 
Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 287, 127 P.3d 187, 190 (2005)). "A requested jury 
instruction need not be given ifit is either an erroneous statement of the law, adequately covered 
by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of the case." Id. (quoting Craig Johnson, LLC 
v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006)). Whether the jury 
instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 
Idaho 46,51,995 P.2d 816,821 (2000) (citing State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,32,951 P.2d 1249, 
1259 (1997)). "However, whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction to 
the jury is within a trial court's discretion." !d. 
B. Appellants have failed to state a cogent or cognizable claim for relief based upon 
what Appellants claim were procedural errors to which Appellants failed to timely 
object. 
The issue framed by Appellants as a failure to instruct the jury on Appellants' 
counterclaims for fraud and constructive fraud was not raised as an issue on appeal. R., p. 
000782-786; R., p. 000823-827; and R., p. 001204-1207. Similarly, Appellants did not object to 
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the failure of the trial court to give jury instructions upon Appellants' claims for fraud and 
constructive fraud. See Tr., Vol. 3, p. 1556, 1. 6 - p. 1569, 1. 24. 13 Moreover, the trial court 
entered its Second Amended Judgment and Decree, on August 6, 2012, resolving all issues 
between the parties, including "all claims and defenses asserted by Counterclaimants." R., p. 
00819-822. Despite filing two motions for a new trial and various other post-trial motions, 
Appellants waited until nearly a year after the trial to raise an issue with respect to their fraud 
and constructive fraud claims. See Hr'g April 10,2013, Hr'g Tr., p. 12,1. 13- p. 27, 1. 1. 
Appellants concede the standard of review for an alleged error that was not the subject of 
a timely objection, but subsequently ignore and fail to address the application of the standard to 
this case. Instead, Appellants criticize the trial judge and neglect to take accountability for their 
own failure to act upon this issue in any semblance of a timely fashion. Regardless of how the 
issue is now framed, Appellants challenge the trial court's failure to give certain jury 
instructions. Rule 51, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the district court consider 
requested jury instructions and further, that: 
Prior to giving any opening or final instructions, the court shall 
furnish copies of them to all parties and allow counsel a reasonable 
time to examine them and make objections outside the presence of 
the jury. No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to 
give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to 
which that party objects and the grounds of the objection. 
13 Ironically enough, AppelIants did not submit proposed instructions upon their fraud and constructive fraud claims. 
See AppelIants Second Motion to Augment the Record, granted by order of this Court on May 2, 2013, including 
Defendants/Counterclaimants' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed January 23,2012 and Defendants/Counterclaimants' 
Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed February 3, 2012. Instead, Appellants appear to rely upon 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Proposed Jury Instructions for fraud and constructive fraud. 
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LR.C.P.51(b). 
Whether characterized as a [remarkably unsupported] constitutional argument with 
respect to Rule 51 or as an appeal from a directed verdict, Appellants fundamentally "assign as 
error the [] failure to give an instruction." LR.C.P. 51(b). Appellants did not object to the failure 
to give jury instructions upon their fraud and constructive fraud claims and further failed to 
appeal from what Appellants' now claim was a "directed verdict.,,14 As noted by the trial court, 
"It wasn't a dismissal. It was an 'I'm not instructing on them,' as I recall." Hr'g April 10,2013, 
Hr'g Tr., p. 21, 11. 20-21. Further, that "[it] is the obligation of counsel to either object to or get 
it on the record and preserve the record and, if it's missing, to make the request within the 
14 ej, Tr., Vol. 3., p. 1558 through 1568: 
MS. JUDD: Your Honor, we will object to the court not giving instructions 
proposed by plaintiffs 54 and 55 with respect to plaintiffs' affirmative fraud 
claim ... 
THE COURT: Thank you. And I note your objection. We did discuss this in 
chambers. In part my ruling is based upon the proposition that, as I read the 
proposed jury instructions, they didn't include an affirmative claim for fraud on 
the part of the plaintiff; but also that, while there's sufficient evidence -
although I think it's thin to go to the jury for the affirmative defense of fraud, I 
don't believe there was sufficient evidence to present the jury with an 
affirmative claim of fraud. Therefore, I overruled the objection to the failure to 
give those instructions. 
MS. JUDD: Thank you, Your Honor. No further objections. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Clark? 
MR. CLARK: Your Honor, I'd just like to note for the record we would have 
preferred the court give us the promissory estoppel instruction because of the 
lack of consideration jury instruction. And I would ask the court to give the SEC 
definition of "executive officer." Other than that, we're happy. Thank you, Your 
Honor. 
Tr., Vol 3., p. 1566, I. 7 - p. 1567, I. 4. 
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timeframe put forth in Rule 29, within the 28 days." Id., at p. 24, I. 25 p. 25, I. 3. The lack of a 
record upon this issue rests solely with Appellants and cannot simply be remedied by asking the 
district court to go back 16 months and draft findings based upon comments it made in a 
chambers conference. 15 Ultimately, the district court refused to give certain jury instructions. 
Rule 51, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, required Appellants to raise an objection to the failure 
to give a particular jury instruction. 
C. Appellants' claim that Rule 51(b) is unconstitutional is spectacularly unsupported. 
Appellants' contention that Rule 51(b) is unconstitutional simply because Appellants 
failed to comply with its directives is as absurd as it is unsupported. Appellants fail to cite to 
identify any authority for this proposition. The Court need "not consider issues cited on appeal 
that are not supported by propositions of law, authority or argument." City of Meridian, 154 
Idaho 425,299 P.3d at 257 (citation omitted). "Put another way, even if an issue is explicitly set 
forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing 
and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." 
Id. (internal quotation omitted.) 
D. The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in refusing to give instructions 
on fraud and constructive fraud. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellants had timely objected to the failure to give 
instructions on fraud and constructive fraud, the trial court acted within the bounds of its 
discretion in refusing to give instructions upon the same. Apart from asking this Court to weigh 
15 "Because I remember going through jury instructions and saying I was not giving particular instructions, because I 
didn't believe the evidence sustained them. And I cannot, from memory, obviously, tell you which those were." 
Hr'g April 10, 20I3, Hr'g Tr., p. 15, II. 8-12. 
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the evidence, Appellants fail to identify how the trial court abused its discretion in determining 
"whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction to the jury." Perry, 134 Idaho 
at 51, 995 P .2d at 821 (citation omitted). Upon the after-the-fact review of the evidence 
Appellants now rely upon, the claim for fraud is indistinguishable from the claim for breach of 
contract: i.e, the parties had a contract for 50% ownership and Respondents, Dollars and Sense 
and Profits Plus, breached the contract by failing to transfer ownership to Respondents. 
Appellants' Brief, pgs. 44-49. The jury ultimately rejected this claim. Moreover, the claim that 
"Street Search also established the constructive fraud requirement of an existing 'special 
relationship," is made without any citation to the record or to authority. Again, as with many of 
Appellants' claims, the Court need not consider issues which are unsupported by cogent 
argument or authority. City a/Meridian, 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d at 257 (citation omitted). 
It is all but impossible to recall what occurred during a pretrial conference in January of 
2012 and the reasons that the Court stated it declined to instruct the jury upon Appellants' claims 
for fraud and constructive fraud. Appellants now seek to capitalize upon the lack of a record to 
suggest that the trial court erred. Had Appellants, as required by Rule 51 (b), objected to the lack 
of a jury instruction upon these theories, perhaps the record would be more clear. Instead, this 
kind of after-the fact discussion as to jury instructions was not preserved for appeal and is 
improper. See Rule 51(b), LR.C.P. 
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v. The Trial Court Acted within the Bounds of its Discretion in Refusing to 
Instruct the Jury Regarding Promissory Estoppel 
As with the claims for fraud and constructive fraud, the trial court acted within the 
bounds of its discretion in declining to instruct the jury upon promissory estoppel. Apart from 
acknowledging that the "determination of whether the instruction is so supported is committed to 
the discretion of the district court," Appellants fail to apply this standard to the record or to 
articulate how the trial court abused its discretion. Appellants' Brief, p. 49-52. Instead, 
Appellants appear to re-argue their fraud claim as an alternative to the contract claim submitted 
to the jury. In this regard, the Court's decision in Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 
362,367-68, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109-10 (2005), is particularly instructive: 
Lettunich argues promissory estoppel should be used in this case to 
prevent KeyBank from denying the enforceability of an oral 
promise. Again, there was no complete promise here to be 
enforced. Promissory estoppel is simply a substitute for 
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between parties. 
Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d 
417, 422 (1981). Consideration includes" action by the promisee 
which is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise." 
Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 607, 428 P.2d 524,526 
(1967). It may also consist of a "detriment to the promisee or a 
benefit to the promisor." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel 
Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 603, 514 P.2d 594, 598 (1973) 
(citations omitted). In this case, Lettunich clearly suffered a 
detriment when he purchased cattle without a way to pay for them. 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no consequence in this 
case because there is evidence of adequate consideration. What is 
lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement. Black Canyon 
Racquetball v. First Nat'l, 119 Idaho 171, 178,804 P.2d 900, 907 
(1991). 
Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367-68, 109 P.3d at 1109-10 (emphasis added); See also Smith v. Boise 
Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63,625 P.2d 417 (1981) ("However, the doctrine of promissory 
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estoppel is intended as a substitute for consideration, Mohr v. Shultz, supra, and not as a 
substitute for an agreement between the parties." Id. at 68,625 P.2d at 422). 
Here, the parties presented differing material terms of an alleged agreement. The jury 
concluded that no contract existed. As with Lettunich, promissory estoppel is inapplicable 
where, as here, "what is lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement." Id. at 368, 109 P.3d at 
1110. The trial court declined to give a jury instruction on promissory estoppel based upon its 
finding that "I did not believe it would be appropriate in this case. It would do nothing more than 
confuse the jury. I think the issues are well laid out for them, and the issue of consideration in 
this case I don't believe is going to revolve on promissory estoppel." The court perceived the 
issue as one of discretion, stated that consideration was not at issue, and acted within the bounds 
of its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury upon the issue. 
VI. The Issue of Whether the Trial Court Acted within the Bounds of its 
Discretion in Excluding Appellants' Exhibits MMM, NNN, and 000 is 
Irrelevant. 
As with Appellants' claim with regard to "Exhibit E," the Court reviews a trial court's 
decision admitting or excluding evidence of damages offered pursuant to Appellants' Exhibits 
MMM, NNN, and 000, under the abuse of discretion standard. White, 140 Idaho at 888, 104 
P.3d at 362 (citations omitted). This issue is easily disposed of as irrelevant because Appellants 
were unable to establish a contract between the parties, the existence of which was the only basis 
for a finding of fiduciary duty, a breach thereof, or damages. City oj Meridian, 154 Idaho 425, 
299 P.3d at 260-61. Appellants do not appeal from the jury verdict as to the existence of a 
contract or from their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the same. 
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R., p. 000782-786; R., p. 000823-827; and R., p. 001204-1207. "In order for the issue of 
damages testimony to be relevant, a party must be able to establish liability." City of Meridian, 
154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d at 26l. Thus, the Court need not address this claim. Id. 
VII. Appellants are not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) allows for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
lli!!1Y in a civil action to recover "in any commercial transaction." I.C. § 12-120(3). A 
commercial transaction includes all transactions except those for personal or household 
purposes. See Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Here, the district court ruled that Respondents, the 
prevailing parties, were entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) and 
Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. R., p. 000797-807. Appellants do not appeal the trial 
court's award of attorney fees - either as to the issue of entitlement or amount. Appellants have 
failed to identify a legal or factual basis to reverse or remand this matter for further proceedings, 
are not the prevailing parties, and are not entitled to attorney fees on appea1. 
VIII. Respondents are Entitled to an Award of Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
On June 8, 2012, the trial court held that that Respondents were entitled to an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. As noted 
in the section _, supra, Appellants do not appeal the trial court's award of attorney fees. For the 
reasons discussed herein, Respondents are likewise entitled to attorney fees on appea1. "The 
attorney fee provisions of I.e. § 12-120 also govern on appea1." Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, 
Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 156,280 P.3d 176, 183 (2012) (citing Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord 
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Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 721, 117 P.3d 130, 135 (2005)); See also Rule 41, 
I.A.R. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Respondents respectfully requests that the Court uphold the 
decision of the district court denying Appellants' motions to dismiss and denying Appellants' 
motion for a new trial. Respondents further request that the Court uphold the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings and deny Appellants' request for attorney fees on appeal. Finally, 
Respondents request the Court award Respondents' their attorney fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
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